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481 
The Role of Equality Principles in 
Preemption Analysis of Sub-federal 
Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act 
Carrie L. Rosenbaum* 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014 the Obama Administration acknowledged 
the serious critiques of Secure Communities and replaced it with 
the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). The United States 
Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Communities 
program had been subject to extensive and prolonged critique, 
and quantitative data suggested that it did not deter crime in 
spite of identifying deportable individuals, nor did it primarily 
result in deportation of dangerous or serious criminals.1 Tangible 
resistance to Secure Communities manifested in the form of 
“sanctuary city” policies and, more recently, sheriffs’ refusal to 
detain individuals otherwise subject to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detainers.2 California is one of two states that 
 
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. Thanks to 
Marisa Cianciarulo and Hiroshi Motomura for invaluable feedback and Kevin Johnson for 
continued mentoring and support; thanks to Jason Cade and Pratheepan Gulasekaram 
for fruitful discussions; earlier versions of this Article benefited from comments at 
immigration law professor workshops; Lauren Champion, for outstanding research 
assistance; and the Chapman Law Review for inviting this Article. 
 1 Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? 
Evidence From “Secure Communities”, 57 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 
4) (on file with author); Charis E. Kubrin, Secure or Insecure Communities? Seven 
Reasons to Abandon the Secure Communities Program, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
323, 324 (2014) (noting that the seven reasons are: “(1) The assumptions upon which 
Secure Communities was founded are flawed; (2) Secure Communities is unnecessary; 
(3) Secure Communities does not target the right offenders; (4) Local law enforcement 
officials have not embraced Secure Communities; (5) Secure Communities creates 
insecure communities; (6) Secure Communities may increase instances of racial profiling 
and pretextual arrests; and (7) Secure Communities is associated with significant human 
costs”); Mark Noferi, New Study Shows Deportations Don’t Reduce Crime, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL IMMIGR. IMPACT (Sept. 9, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/09/new-
study-shows-deportations-dont-reduce-crime/.  
 2 However, this has not stopped rogue sheriffs, such as Sacramento, California 
Sheriff Scott Jones, now being sued in federal district court as of January 23, 2015 for 
wrongful detention on an ICE hold in clear contravention of the TRUST Act. See Lawsuit 
Challenges Immigration Holds on Undocumented Californians (KPFA 94.1–FM Berkeley 
radio broadcast Jan. 23, 2015), available at http://pacificaeveningnews.blogspot.com/2015/ 
01/lawsuit-challenges-immigration-holds-on.html; Complaint at 14–15, Del Agua v. Jones 
(E.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 2:15-cv-00185) (on file with author).  
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has gone a step further and codified the objection to Secure 
Communities by legislating instances where sub-federal law 
enforcement cannot comply with ICE detainer requests. Even 
though PEP eliminated one of the most controversial aspects of 
Secure Communities, in practice PEP will be similar to Secure 
Communities.3 
Secure Communities significantly increased the involvement 
of state and local authorities in enforcement of federal 
immigration law. The discretion wielded by sub-federal agents 
has raised numerous concerns, including racial profiling and the 
threat of individual rights violations. Secure Communities has 
also been criticized for failing to effectively target non-citizens 
whom the Department of Homeland Security designated as 
priorities for enforcement action. 
Racial profiling, or the threat of racial profiling, resulting 
from sub-federal agents’ involvement in policing immigration is 
not adequately deterred or remedied through existing legal 
means, including for example, equal protection causes of action, 
Fourth Amendment motions to suppress, or acts of prosecutorial 
discretion in the immigration system.4 In the absence of adequate 
measures to counteract the problems with Secure Communities, 
and absent comprehensive federal immigration reform that 
would provide a path to legalization, sub-federal entities have 
increasingly begun to take formal measures to counteract Secure 
Communities and its adverse impacts on communities. 
California’s TRUST Act is one such response to these 
deficiencies.  
In addition to a plethora of city and county ordinances and 
policies, as of the time of writing, two states, California and 
Connecticut, have passed “TRUST” Acts—sub-federal integrative 
 
 3 Even though PEP eliminates the general policy of requesting sub-federal law 
enforcement cooperation in prolonging detention of a suspected unauthorized migrant for 
forty-eight hours and claims to prioritize specific individuals with convictions for crimes 
that indicate dangerousness, PEP replaces the request by ICE for continued detention 
with a request for immediate notification of an individual’s impending release. It does not 
eliminate the fingerprints. Thus, for all intents and purposes, PEP, even after the TRUST 
Act in California, will be no different and will not disincentivize local law enforcement 
from using stops, arrests, and potential citations as a way to potentially identify those 
they perceive to be unauthorized migrants. 
 4 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1056 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) 
(showing that, similar to equal protection causes of action, proving a Fourth Amendment 
violation in immigration court sufficient to merit suppression requires “egregious 
violations”); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (explaining 
that ethnicity is one of many factors used by immigration enforcement agents in 
identifying unauthorized migrants and is therefore tolerated and not viewed as 
discriminatory in immigration enforcement). 
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immigration measures5 restricting sub-federal agents’ ability to 
prolong detention of suspected immigration violators. These acts 
do not prevent information sharing between local authorities and 
federal immigration enforcement agents as prior immigrant 
integrative, or sanctuary, laws attempted to do.6 The TRUST 
Acts are limited to preventing detention of some categories of 
suspected unauthorized migrants or non-citizens by sub-federal 
agents beyond the original sentence of criminal incarceration. 
Are TRUST Acts vulnerable to preemption as state 
immigration laws? The immigrant integration function of states 
and the role of the federal government in protecting immigrants 
from discrimination suggest that perhaps they would not be 
preempted. This Article will discuss why the California TRUST 
Act, an integrative immigration law, would not be preempted 
regardless of whether it is considered under traditional 
methodologies, and particularly not if its integrative qualities are 
considered. Particularly because Secure Communities may be 
responsible for incentivizing racial profiling and ethnically driven 
policing, absent appropriate remedies or protections, the 
principles of the 1870 Civil Rights Act and “equality principles” 
should be a part of the preemption analysis of measures like 
California’s TRUST Act. 
This Article will begin in Section I by describing the 
California TRUST Act. Section II considers sub-federal 
enforcement of immigration law focusing on Secure Communities 
and immigration detainers. Section III addresses the factors that 
led to passage of the TRUST Act, such as the threat of racial 
profiling where sub-federal agents have the opportunity to 
engage in pretextual immigration enforcement. Section IV 
considers the shortcomings of existing remedies to profiling in 
sub-federal, pretextual immigration enforcement, Section V 
assesses whether the TRUST Act would be preempted, and 
Section VI defines and assesses equality principles and considers 
the ultimate question of why the TRUST Act would not be 
 
 5 “Integrative” measures or laws refer to those that encourage integration or 
otherwise treat non-citizen unauthorized migrants as intending immigrants and 
“Americans in Waiting,” or those that otherwise attempt to minimize the adverse 
consequences of the discrimination that happens as a result of the legal category that 
includes citizens and residents and excludes others. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
89−91 (2007). Anti-detainer laws, like the TRUST Act, are integrative measures because 
they attempt to minimize the harms caused by policies like Secure Communities that 
emphasize the difference between those who are lawfully present, and those who are not.  
 6 Tyche Hendricks, Immigrant Sanctuary Laws Seen as Practical, SFGATE (July 6, 
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Immigrant-sanctuary-laws-seen-as-
practical-3206563.php 
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preempted if such principles were employed in a preemption 
analysis.  
I. THE CALIFORNIA TRUST ACT 
In 2013 two states, California7 and Connecticut,8 passed 
statewide legislation known as the TRUST Act. In both states the 
TRUST Act prohibits local law enforcement from detaining 
individuals pursuant to an ICE hold request, except under 
limited circumstances.9 The TRUST Acts are responsive, 
grassroots legislative efforts arising out of a combination of a lack 
of federal immigration reform providing avenues to lawful 
permanent resident status and an increase in internal 
enforcement,10 including Secure Communities. However, TRUST 
Acts are also a means of bringing equality principles to the 
forefront of immigration enforcement concerns, rather than 
allowing the threat or reality of racial profiling to continue to 
evade detection and appropriate, effective response.11  
The California TRUST Act was the result of a multi-year 
effort by advocates to address the many perceived harms caused 
by Secure Communities and recently confirmed allegations that 
data does not support the conclusion that Secure Communities 
has had any impact on crime.12 Since implementation, the 
TRUST Act has impacted the number of immigration arrests 
resulting in deportations. The number of Secure Communities 
related deportations has declined since implementation of the 
TRUST Act.  Following implementation, in February and March 
2014 there were 2288 arrests resulting in deportation, as 
compared to 2875 in a similar period shortly before 
implementation of the TRUST Act.13 
The TRUST Act prohibits immigration holds except in 
limited circumstances, including specific categories of 
convictions, a probable cause determination for specific kinds of 
charges (described in paragraph (5) of California Government 
 
 7 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–7282.5 (West 2014). Information for advocates, 
attorneys, and community members about the California TRUST Act can be found at 
http://www.catrustact.org. 
 8 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h (2014). 
 9 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h(b). 
 10 Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 615–16 (2012); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1148–52 (5th ed. 2009) (describing increased 
resources for interior enforcement). 
 11 This Article will focus primarily on California’s TRUST Act. 
 12 Miles & Cox, supra note 1.  
 13 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: 
MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2014 (2014), available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2014-to-date.pdf. 
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Code section 7282.5a), where the arrestee is a current registrant 
on the California Sex and Arson Registry, or where specific 
categories of federal criminal arrest warrants are in place.14 In 
California, certain categories of criminal detainees must be 
released from custody when charges have been dropped, 
dismissed, left unfiled, or when the detainee posts bond, is 
acquitted of all charges, has completed an existing sentence, or is 
otherwise eligible for release from custody.15 In other words, in 
order for a sub-federal agent to have the authority to exercise 
discretion to comply with an ICE detainer request, two conditions 
must now be met in California. First, one of the conditions in 
California Government Code section 7282.5(a)(1)–(6) must be 
present, and, second, compliance with the request may not 
violate federal, state, or local law.16  
The California law identifies specific offenses wherein 
sheriffs may comply with an ICE hold request, including: specific 
serious or violent felonies (some requiring a judge to have made a 
probable cause determination pursuant to Penal Code section 
872); higher level misdemeanors or “wobbler” crimes that can be 
classified as either a misdemeanor or felony; inclusion on the 
state sex offender registry; or when the individual has an 
outstanding federal criminal arrest warrant.17 If the detainee has 
committed one of the above crimes, local authorities can detain 
him or her pursuant to an ICE request.18 
Some of the circumstances in California where sheriffs may 
still have authority to exercise discretion to comply with an ICE 
hold request after implementation of the TRUST Act include:  
felony charges absent a conviction with a determination of 
probable cause pursuant to Penal Code section 872(a) (as opposed 
to a determination of probable cause for arrest purposes); 
domestic violence convictions; felonious driving under the 
influence; and felonious drug convictions.19 If the detainee has 
 
 14 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5(a); Letter from Spencer Amdur, Lawyers’ Comm. for 
Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area, et al., to Cal. Cnty. Counsel 5 (Dec. 19, 2013), available 
at http://www.catrustact.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/trust_act_memorandum_-_12_19 
_13.pdf. (on file with author) 
 15 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282(b)(1)–(5). 
 16 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5(a). 
 17 Id.  
 18 In Connecticut, the exceptions under which law enforcement may detain someone 
include: if the individual has been convicted of a felony, has not posted bond, has an 
outstanding arrest warrant in Connecticut, has been identified as a gang member or 
possible terrorist, is subject to a deportation order, or if the local law enforcement officer 
deems the person a risk to public safety. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h(b) (2014). 
 19 See Letter from Spencer Amdur, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay 
Area, et al., to Cal. Cnty. Counsel, supra note 14, at 6–11. However, the circumstances 
under which local authorities may detain a juvenile are even more limited, since juveniles 
may only be detained if they have been convicted of a crime pursuant to California Penal 
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committed one of the above crimes, local authorities may have 
authority to choose to detain him or her pursuant to an ICE 
request. 
Because the TRUST Act prevents immigration holds, except 
for the limited exceptions outlined in the Act, it will impact those 
who came to ICE’s attention through Secure Communities or any 
other program where federal officials make immigration hold 
requests following identification of a suspected immigration 
violator.20 ICE will still become aware of the individual and may 
still pursue removal proceedings. However, the TRUST Act 
prevents a sheriff from maintaining custody for an additional 
forty-eight hours to facilitate transfer to immigration detention 
once the arrestee is eligible for release from criminal custody. 
The purpose of the TRUST Act is to set a minimum standard 
for elective compliance with ICE detainer requests to protect 
detainees from being held after they are eligible for release from 
criminal custody. However, the TRUST Act does not preclude 
local officials from enacting further protections for detainees 
against ICE holds. If a county wishes to further limit its own law 
enforcement’s ability to comply with ICE hold requests, such as 
San Francisco and Santa Clara Counties—and increasingly 
others around the country—they may do so.21  
Approximately forty cities and counties in California have 
adopted even stronger ICE hold reform policies, restricting 
detainers even more than the California TRUST Act.22 Cities and 
counties continue to enact more restrictive policies in part to 
avoid litigation and potential liability related to Fourth and 
Tenth Amendment concerns caused by compliance with ICE 
detainer requests.23 
When a sub-federal entity legislates in an area that may be 
considered traditionally reserved to the federal government, such 
as immigration law, the issue of preemption may arise. The 
 
Code section 667(d)(3). See id. at 11. The letter to the County Counsel also indicates that 
because detainers may be unconstitutional, compliance with the TRUST Act only shields 
counties from state-law litigation. In other words, if a sheriff complies with an ICE 
detainer request under circumstances authorized by TRUST, they may not be subject to 
liability under TRUST, but still may be subject to liability pursuant to section 1983. See 
id. at 12.  
 20 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2014); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282(c). 
 21 See CAL. TRUST ACT, http://www.catrustact.org/text-of-trust-acts.html (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2014), for a list of states and several counties across the country that 
have adopted TRUST Acts. 
 22 See id. for a list of California county policies implementing the TRUST Act.  
 23 See Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to Hold 
Noncitizens for Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/ 
06/us/politics/fearing-lawsuits-sheriffs-balk-at-us-request-to-detain-non-citizens-for-extra-
time.html?_r=0. 
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continued lack of comprehensive immigration reform has seen 
hundreds of sub-federal immigration measures throughout the 
country,24 and accordingly, increased preemption litigation. The 
increase in preemption cases25 has spurred consideration of what 
role preemption should play in invalidating pro-enforcement or 
integrative sub-federal immigration measures in the current 
political context.  
Would the California TRUST Act survive a preemption 
challenge? Should the underlying reasons for passing the TRUST 
Act, such as concerns about racial profiling, matter in the 
preemption determination? Before addressing whether the 
TRUST Act would be preempted, I will outline Secure 
Communities, immigration detainers, and relevant critiques of 
both. In the context of addressing this background pertaining to 
the impetus for the TRUST Act, I will address the notion of 
“equality principles,” and then finally, the role equality principles 
may play in a preemption assessment of the TRUST Act. 
II. WHY TRUST?: SECURE COMMUNITIES, IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS, AND SUB-FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION 
LAW 
While enforcement of immigration law has historically been 
considered a plenary power of the federal government, 
particularly after Congress passed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, 
there has been a marked shift towards increased interior 
enforcement of immigration law—some authorized by federal law 
and some unauthorized.26 With this shift towards interior 
enforcement has come significant participation of sub-federal law 
enforcement agents in the process of enforcing immigration law. 
Low-level offenses, like traffic offenses and misdemeanors, have 
 
 24 The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that “[s]ince 2007, on 
average, 1,300 [state immigration-related] bills are introduced each year and 200 laws are 
enacted.” ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT 
POLICY PROJECT: 2013 IMMIGRATION REPORT 2 (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
Portals/1/Documents/immig/2013ImmigrationReport_Jan21.pdf. 
 25 One scholar notes that preemption cases are increasingly a priority for the 
Roberts Court and cites Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting to 
suggest that “preemption will be an important part of its doctrinal legacy.” Ernest A. 
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the 
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 341. In addition to the above immigration cases, 
“[t]he court has decided at least 10 preemption cases since early 2008, including ones on 
such products as prescription drugs, medical devices, and car seat belts.” James Vicini, 
Analysis: Supreme Court Immigration Case a Federal-State Test, TERRA NEWS (Sept. 20, 
2014, 2:45 PM), http://en.terra.com/news/news/analysis_supreme_court_immigration_case 
_a_federal_state_test/act439622. 
 26 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 148–51 (2010). 
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disproportionately been the underlying offenses resulting in ICE 
detainers.27 For reasons that will be explored more fully in the 
next sections, the role of sub-federal law enforcement agents and 
the use of low-level offenses to identify potential unauthorized 
migrants trigger concerns about discriminatory policing. 
Problems with discriminatory policing suggest the 
appropriateness of consideration of equality principles in the 
preemption analysis of the TRUST Act.  
Secure Communities, immigration detainers,  state laws, 
and municipal regulations have all contributed to an 
environment of expanding sub-federal involvement in the 
enforcement of immigration law with troubling implications. 
After enactment of IIRIRA, the former INS created ICE 
Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety 
and Security (ICE ACCESS) measures, which were intended to 
enhance cooperation between federal and sub-federal agents. 
Initially, and until recently, ICE used agreements establishing 
formal enforcement collaboration with sub-federal authorities, 
authorized under section 287(g),28 to explicitly delegate power to 
states and localities to deputize their law enforcement agents to 
enforce federal immigration laws.29 Memorandums of Agreement 
(MOA) established a scope of authority delegated to sub-federal 
agents, and established training protocols. However, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) moved away from use 
of 287(g) agreements in favor of Secure Communities, likely 
because of the lesser federal resources required by Secure 
Communities, which does not require training or the same degree 
of oversight.30  
As a part of the Obama Administration’s emphasis on 
enforcement, in 2008 DHS implemented Secure Communities to 
identify, detain, and remove “criminal aliens” with a stated 
priority of targeting non-citizens who are a danger to national 
security or public safety, “repeat violators,” and those deemed 
“fugitives” due to outstanding removal orders.31 Secure 
Communities was allegedly intended to target “convicted 
 
 27 Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRACIMMIGR. 
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/. 
 28 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) (providing statutory authority for 287(g) agreements).  
 29 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)); see also 
Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377 (B.I.A. 1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ 
intdec/vol19/3011.pdf. 
 30 DHS has stated that Secure Communities is more “efficient.” Michele Waslin, ICE 
Scaling Back 287(g) Program, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL IMMIGR. IMPACT (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/19/ice-scaling-back-287g-program/. 
 31 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
secure_communities/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
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criminals,” specifically those characterized as “aggravated 
felons.”32 As of the end of 2013, all jurisdictions in the United 
States had activated the Secure Communities program. From 
implementation in 2008 to August 2014, Secure Communities 
resulted in 118,439 deportations in California alone.33 One 
scholar has notably referred to Secure Communities as “one of 
the most ubiquitous examples of immigrant-exclusionary 
immigration federalism.”34 
Secure Communities established a mandatory sharing of 
information between local jail officials and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agents anytime an individual is arrested 
and booked.35 Information sharing happens regardless of whether 
or not criminal charges are even ever filed. Historically, anytime 
sub-federal law enforcement agents book an individual in 
connection with an alleged crime, their fingerprints are 
transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Secure 
Communities created the connection between the sub-federal law 
enforcement arrest and the immigration authorities by then 
transmitting those same fingerprints to DHS. DHS then checks 
the biometric information against its own database—the 
Automated Biometric Identification System or “IDENT.”36  
Where the arrestee is suspected to be a non-citizen based on 
the IDENT database results, under Secure Communities DHS 
could issue an immigration detainer or place an immigration 
hold requesting that the local law enforcement agents hold the 
individual in detention for up to forty-eight hours following 
completion of the criminal sentence and before issuance of a 
Notice to Appear (NTA).37 IDENT, however, does not necessarily 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 6; U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY 2013 ICE IMMIGRATION REMOVALS 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter FY 2013 REMOVALS], available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/ 
pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf (368,644 in 2013). 
 34 Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 724 
(2013). 
 35 States and municipalities have also increasingly been passing laws to permit their 
local law enforcement agents to have a role in checking immigration status when an 
individual is booked into a jail; however, state laws encouraging or authorizing 
sub-federal agents a role in policing immigration law will not be the focus of this Article. 
Secure Communities, supra note 31. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/ 
factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). Before ICE makes a detainer request, the 
arrestee’s fingerprints are submitted electronically to the Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The fingerprint data is automatically 
transmitted to the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS), and the 
prints are then compared with the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (USVISIT) and IDENT. This is the stage at which the sub-federal agent and 
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give a black or white answer concerning a non-citizen’s status  
because determination of status requires a sophisticated 
application and understanding of immigration law to an 
individual’s unique factual situation.38 The database merely 
categorizes individuals as either: (1) non-citizens present in the 
United States in violation of immigration laws, perhaps as a 
result of a prior deportation or overstaying a visa, (2) noncitizens 
who are lawfully present but could be deportable if convicted of 
specific crimes, or (3) naturalized citizens who are in the system 
only because they were, at some prior time, not U.S. citizens.  
The TRUST Act relates to Secure Communities through its 
restrictions on immigration detainers. A detainer, or “ICE hold,” 
is a request that the state or local law enforcement agent hold 
the arrestee for up to forty-eight hours after completion of the 
criminal sentence so that ICE may take the individual into 
immigration custody and initiate immigration removal 
proceedings.39 Initially, prior to 1987, detainers served as 
notification to jail or prison officials that the former INS wanted 
to be notified before the prisoner was released.40 Subsequently, 
the Executive Branch enacted federal regulations requiring that 
agencies receiving a detainer request hold the arrestee for 
forty-eight hours. With the implementation of Secure 
Communities, the use of detainers became significantly more 
common and has had a dramatic effect on the number of 
immigration arrests, detentions, deportation orders, and 
removals.41  
 
ICE obtain some information about the arrestee’s immigration status. If the fingerprints 
register a match in the IDENT immigration database, CJIS automatically sends data to 
the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). Within hours of the initial arrest, ICE 
determines whether or not to issue a detainer request so that ICE may obtain custody and 
initiate removal proceedings. Secure Communities, supra note 31. Note that under PEP 
the prolonged detention would not be authorized, but the information will still be shared 
with DHS who may still mobilize officers to make an immigration arrest once the 
individual is released from criminal custody.  
 38 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (illustrating the 
complexities involved in the federal governance of immigration and alien status). Just as 
the Supreme Court refused to recognize the state of Arizona’s delegation of sub-federal 
agents to enforce immigration law and determine whether an individual was removable 
because such determinations require complex legal analyses, the same problem is 
implicated here. However, this issue will not be addressed in this Article. 
 39 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2014). 
 40 Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under 
Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 283 n.16 (2013) (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM I-247 (1983)); Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 133, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)). Under PEP, this or a 
similar notification practice will likely be in place. 
 41 AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL 
WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (2011) (noting a significant increase in 
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Section 287.7(a) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
provides the authority for immigration detainers. The 
regulations define detainers as “requests” that “advise another 
law enforcement agency” that ICE would like to take custody of 
the person in question.42 The only language creating a mandatory 
duty on behalf of the detaining agent concerns possible 
constitutional violations and specifies that a hold must not 
exceed forty-eight hours.43 The sections of the U.S. Code 
referenced in the detainer regulations indicate that ICE may 
collaborate with localities that “choose” to participate in 
immigration enforcement.44  
Immigration detainers have been challenged from policy and 
legal doctrinal perspectives. Before TRUST Acts were in place, 
states and localities began demonstrating increasing resistance 
to ICE immigration detainer requests.45 While local authorities 
could hypothetically refuse to fingerprint arrestees, resistance to 
Secure Communities and detainers has typically taken other 
forms. Fourth and Tenth Amendment challenges have caused 
numerous local sheriffs throughout the country to announce that 
they would no longer honor detainer requests.46 Since January 
2013, detainer requests have dropped by nearly twenty percent.47 
During a fifty-month period beginning in FY 2008 through the 
beginning of FY 2012, ICE issued close to one million detainers.48 
 
prosecutions and deportations since the Obama Administration’s implementation of 
Secure Communities); AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE 
GROWTH OF THE U.S. DEPORTATION MACHINE 5 (2014), available at http://www.immi 
grationpolicy.org/printpdf/3283 (citing the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which 
stated that “from October 2008 through March 2012, Secure Communities led to the 
removal of about 183,000 aliens”). 
 42 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. 
 43 Id.; see Letter from Spencer Amdur, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. 
Bay Area, et al., to Cal. Cnty. Counsel, supra note 14. 
 44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(11), (c) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d). 
 45 While there has been much consideration of whether or not ICE detainers are 
mandatory, this Article will examine the issue only to the extent necessary to consider 
whether the California TRUST Act could be deemed preempted. There has been much 
controversy over whether ICE holds are mandatory directives or mere requests, and the 
outcome may pertain to the ultimate federalism question considered here. 
 46 See Some Colorado Sheriffs Ending Immigrant Detainers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 
2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/04/29/us/ap-us-immigration-det 
ainers.html; Letter to ACLU of San Diego (July 31, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining 
that San Diego, California Sheriffs will no longer use the I-200 Administrative Warrants 
as a basis for detaining individuals longer than their time of release and will treat these 
administrative arrests just like detainers); Medina, supra note 23. 
 47 The total number of detainers in 2012 was 273,982. Number of ICE Detainers 
Drops by 19 Percent, TRACIMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/325/ (last 
updated January 2013). 
 48 Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, TRACIMMIGR. (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/. 
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The next section will explore the perceived need for the 
TRUST Act and measures that lessen the role of sub-federal law 
enforcement agents in immigration policing.  
III.  SUB-FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ DISCRETION TO 
ARREST AND SHADOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT49 
Secure Communities empowers sub-federal agents to 
participate in identifying potentially unauthorized migrants. 
Because an arrest under Secure Communities automatically 
exposes any arrestee to the possibility of identification by federal 
immigration authorities,50 it could incentivize state and local law 
enforcement agents to use criminal law violations as a pretext to 
enforce immigration law.51 Sub-federal agents have significant 
power because of their discretion to make arrests.52 Such 
“shadow immigration enforcement” may involve pretextual, 
though still legal, enforcement of criminal or traffic laws based 
on perceived ethnic or racial characteristics.53  
As state and local law enforcement officers have become 
increasingly involved in enforcement of federal immigration law, 
their power to make or not make an initial arrest can be the act 
that creates a cascading effect for the individual arrestee, as well 
as his or her family and community. Sub-federal agents can, for 
example, use minor traffic violations as a pretext for determining 
immigration status.54 There is little to prevent a local law 
enforcement agent from stopping individuals solely to check their 
immigration status, instead of checking their immigration status 
incidental to a legitimate arrest that they intend to pursue for 
substantive, criminal reasons.55 Concern about the lack of 
 
 49  See Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and Its 
Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 230 (2014) (explaining 
“shadow immigration enforcement” as state or local police lacking immigration 
enforcement authority who use their police powers for the unsanctioned purposes of 
federal immigration enforcement and discussing the problem of the unavailability of 
usual constitutional law safeguards in the immigration context).  
 50 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
CONTEXT: HOW DISCRETION IS EXERCISED THROUGHOUT OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 4, 7 
(2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/motomura_-
_discretion_in_context_04112.pdf. 
 51 Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies 
and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1186–87 (2012). 
 52 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 128–31 (2014) (discussing 
discretion, which includes “micro-macro” discretion, in enforcement and the role of 
arresting agents). 
 53  Sweeney, supra note 49, at 240. 
 54  Banks, supra note 51.  
 55 ACLU LEGAL ACTION CTR., COMMENTS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT DRAFT DETAINER POLICY 15 (2010), available at http://www.legalaction 
center.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NGO-DetainerCommentsFinal-10-1-2010.pdf (noting 
that racial profiling has been a persistent concern where sub-federal agents are 
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adequate prevention of unconstitutional policing by sub-federal 
agents is not a new problem, and it has typically been presumed 
that federal agents may be less likely to engage in such 
conduct.56  
A.  Discretion to Arrest and the Problem of Profiling in 
Sub-federal Enforcement of Immigration Law 
Discretion by law enforcement officers is generally exercised 
on micro and macro levels.57 “Micro” level discretion may take the 
form of decisions by local, state, or federal law enforcement 
agents to arrest or prosecute, or not arrest or prosecute, an 
individual. Micro level discretion may be exercised at the time of 
the initial criminal arrest, or later, when either criminal 
prosecutors or immigration trial attorneys decide what charge(s), 
if any, to allege, or after a trial has begun.58  
Patrol officers have a significant amount of discretion to 
decide whom to stop, arrest, and detain.59 An officer exercises 
micro level discretion when deciding to stop an individual for a 
traffic violation or minor criminal offense, or make an arrest, 
rather than just issue a citation.60 Secure Communities likely 
was, and PEP may remain a powerful and effective tool for a 
patrol officer motivated to decrease the presence of migrants she 
or he perceives as unauthorized.61 
“Macro” level discretion functions at a systemic level such as 
when agencies and officials make policy decisions establishing 
enforcement priorities and commit resources accordingly.62 
Sub-federal agents’ roles in policing immigration law are 
 
empowered to enforce immigration law); Lasch, supra note 40, at 292 (citing ACLU LEGAL 
ACTION CTR., supra); see Violeta R. Chapin, ¡Silencio! Undocumented Immigrant 
Witnesses and the Right to Silence, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 152–54 (2011) (discussing 
racial profiling concerns resulting from state and local immigration enforcement). 
 56 Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional 
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting 
Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1119 (referencing the Lopez-Mendoza decision, 
where “Chief Justice Burger believed that INS was ‘better than most police departments ’ 
at preventing constitutional violations from occurring”) (quoting Justice Harry Blackmun, 
Harry Blackmun’s Conference Notes (Apr. 20, 1984), in HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, 
407/83/491 (Manuscript Division, Library of Cong., Washington D.C.)).  
 57 MOTOMURA, supra note 50, at 3–5. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 4; see Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1819, 1842–49 (2011). 
 60 Banks, supra note 51, at 1184. See generally Motomura, supra note 59, at 1819 
(showing how the discretion to arrest at state and local levels can in some ways assume a 
kind of “abdication of federal authority”).  
 61 Banks, supra note 51, at 1179–80. 
 62 Id. at 1183–84; MOTOMURA, supra note 50, at 2. 
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influenced by macro level exercises of discretion, which may in 
turn be evidenced by their micro level exercises of discretion. As 
an example, in some regions, such as Maricopa County, Arizona, 
local authorities create de facto macro level policies that 
encourage pretextual enforcement of immigration law.63 
A local sheriff encouraging patrol officers to arrest, rather 
than just cite a driver without a valid license, or to apply rigorous 
standards for what constitutes a valid license, are examples of 
macro level discretion. Similarly, when government and law 
enforcement officials make public statements implicitly or 
directly blaming the undocumented population for crime, or 
suggest that any crime should subject non-citizens to 
deportation,64 they convey macro-level policy directives. When an 
ICE supervisor states, contrary to federal law, that traffic 
violations represent “a public safety threat significant enough to 
warrant removal,” the supervisor influences discretion on macro 
and micro levels.65 
Secure Communities can create a context for discretion at 
both of these micro and macro levels. DHS has expressed 
intentions regarding whom individual officers should pursue, 
emphasizing a focus on serious criminals,66 but local criminal 
justice officers may function outside of these directives. 
Moreover, ICE supervisors may or may not proactively address 
discrepancies between the federal policy objectives and how 
officers are exercising discretion in carrying out their authority.67 
The absence of means to ensure compliance with federal 
immigration arrest priorities suggests the appropriateness of 
preventative measures like the TRUST Act, which may decrease 
the prevalence of undetected and undeterred rights violations.  
Secure Communities does not provide an express delegation 
of authority to sub-federal agents, but nonetheless, discretion 
exercised on micro and macro levels may play a role in whether 
and how an officer or agency exercises discretion in policing, 
including identifying individuals for an initial stop.68 Laws, for 
 
 63 See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825–26 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 64 See, e.g., Brian Fraga, Sheriff Hodgson on ‘Secure Communities’ and 
Undocumented Immigrants, SOUTHCOASTTODAY.COM (June 9, 2011), http://blogs.south 
coasttoday.com/new-bedford-crime/2011/06/09/sheriff-hodgson-on-secure-communities-and 
-undocumented-immigrants/. 
 65 Banks, supra note 51, at 1183 (quoting RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY 
INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(g) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 6 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-diver 
gence.pdf). 
 66 Secure Communities, supra note 31. 
 67 See Banks, supra note 51, at 1182–84. 
 68 MOTOMURA, supra note 50, at 2, 4. 
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example, that authorize officers to use their discretion to arrest a 
driver without a license at the time of the stop, combined with 
Secure Communities or PEP, give sub-federal agents significant 
power to determine which drivers’ immigration status will be 
checked.69 Micro and macro exercises of discretion thus 
contribute significantly to the possibility of improper pretextual 
enforcement of immigration law as a result of Secure 
Communities, and now the PEP program.  
B.  Pretextual Arrests and Racial Profiling by Sub-federal 
Agents  
Allegations of increased racial profiling immediately followed 
implementation of Secure Communities, as was the case 
following implementation of 287(g) agreements, and as will likely 
continue under PEP.70 Race has historically been, and still serves 
as, a proxy for belonging and citizenship,71 even though use of 
race as the only factor in making a civil immigration stop is 
illegal.72 Resistance to Secure Communities and ICE detainers 
prompted substantiated civil rights and racial profiling 
concerns.73  
Indeed, local law enforcement agents may use pretextual 
arrests to identify people they believe are unauthorized migrants 
to bring them to the attention of federal immigration 
authorities.74 From the inception of Secure Communities to 
approximately 2011, 93% of those identified as removable 
 
 69 Banks, supra note 51, at 1186. 
 70 Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, supra note 37; Chacón, supra note 26, at 149; Suzanne Ito, No Security in 
“Secure Communities”, ACLU (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:54 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
immigrants-rights-racial-justice/no-security-secure-co mmunities; Immigration Bait and 
Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/18/opinion/18wed3.html?_r=0. 
 71 For examples of select scholarly works addressing race as a proxy for citizenship, 
see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Devon W. Carbado 
& Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); 
Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2009); Rose Cuison 
Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial Regulation of 
Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1390–402 (2011) (considering the federal government’s 
policing of interracial marriages and citizenship law). See also KOHLI, MARKOWITZ 
& CHAVEZ, supra note 41, at 2, 6 (finding 93% of people arrested under Secure 
Communities pursuant to one study were from Latin American countries).  
 72 Mexican appearance may be one of many factors relied on in making a civil 
immigration stop. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975) 
(noting ethnicity as one of many factors used by immigration enforcement agents in 
identifying unauthorized migrants). 
 73 See generally supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 74 TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON 
LAW & SOC. POLICY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN 
PROGRAM (2009). 
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through Secure Communities were Latinos, while only 77% of the 
undocumented population was Latino.75  
Not only did the majority of those subject to detainers in 
2008 to 2012 lack a criminal record (at the time of the detainer 
issuing or after),76 but over 80% of ICE detainers were issued in 
cases involving men from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, or Cuba.77 Put differently, 95% of detainers were 
issued against males with a median age of thirty, and 80% of 
detainers were issued against Latinos. Specifically, 72.7% were 
Mexican citizens, approximately 15% were Guatemalans, 
Hondurans, El Salvadorans, or Cubans, and only about 22,000 
were Canadian citizens.78 Thus, the majority of ICE detainers 
have been issued against Latino males without criminal 
histories, or those whose criminal arrest leading to issuance of 
the detainer was not related to a serious offense.79 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona is one 
particularly well-known example of a powerful law enforcement 
agent’s sanctioning of the improper use of sub-federal 
immigration policing powers. His discriminatory policing was so 
egregious and his intentions so clearly discriminatory and 
anti-immigrant that the Department of Justice pursued 
litigation.80 However, discriminatory policing may be less 
blatant, evading detection, sanction, or deterrence.  
 
 75 KOHLI, MARKOWITZ & CHAVEZ, supra note 41, at 2. 
 76 Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, supra note 48 (“In more than two out of 
three (77.4%) of the detainers issued by ICE, the record shows that the individual who 
had been identified had no criminal record — either at the time the detainer was issued 
or subsequently. For the remaining 22.6 percent that had a criminal record, only 
8.6 percent of the charges were classified as a Level 1 offense.”); see also id. fig.1. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 “In FY 2014, DHS conducted a total of 577,295 removals and returns, including  
414,481 removals and 162,814 returns. ICE had a total of 315,943 removals or returns,  
and CBP made 486,651 apprehensions.” Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS  
Releases End of Year Statistics (Dec. 19, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2014/12/19/dhs-releases-end-year-statistics (on file with author); see also FY 2013 
REMOVALS, supra note 33. ICE’s FY 2013 removal statistics indicate that 82% of those 
removed from the interior had criminal convictions, as opposed to 60% the prior year. Id. 
Even though more deportees may have had a criminal conviction than in the prior fiscal 
year, the data does not demonstrate that the crimes were overwhelmingly serious or 
violent, nor that pretextual enforcement is no longer a problem. Moreover, the author of 
the study contends that even if this alleged problem does not impact the majority of 
deportees, the problem of pretextual enforcement or racial profiling still merits significant 
consideration. Id. 
 80 The Department of Justice sued the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office for civil 
rights violations, beginning with an investigation in June 2008, and filed a lawsuit in May 
2012, culminating in a ruling by Judge Snow that Arpaio had systematically profiled 
Latinos. Arpaio has since been found to have defied the court’s order. Fernanda Santo, 
Angry Judge Says Sheriff Defied Order on Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2014, at A18. 
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In the case of Sheriff Arpaio, the Department of Justice 
concluded that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office was 
responsible for “egregious, pervasive and systemic” racial 
profiling.81 Latino drivers in Maricopa County were significantly 
more likely to be subject to a traffic stop than similarly situated 
non-Latinos, and patrol officers conducted stops without 
constitutionally required reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.82  
Following the Department of Justice litigation against 
Sheriff Arpaio, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced the 
decision to rescind part of the 287(g) agreement in Arizona, 
stating, “Discrimination undermines law enforcement and erodes 
the public trust. DHS will not be a party to such practices.”83 
DHS instructed Arizona DHS not to respond to local police 
requests to enforce immigration law following a traffic stop or 
other law enforcement action unless the person targeted actually 
met the DHS criteria for Secure Communities, including those 
with criminal convictions and prior removals with unlawful 
reentries.84 DHS’s termination of a 287(g) agreement was 
virtually unprecedented.85 
Even before Secure Communities, local police officers had 
been complicit in racially motivated immigration law 
enforcement. One infamous example was what became known as 
the “Chandler Roundup,” where local police officers in Chandler, 
Arizona targeted individuals based on appearance and inability 
to speak fluent English and, with Border Patrol officers, spent a 
week arresting 432 people of Hispanic/Latino descent who were 
 
 81 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Bill 
Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney for Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 6 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf. 
 82 U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES: STATISTICAL MONITORING 
(2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-statistical-monit 
oring.pdf. 
 83 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Napolitano on 
DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 2011), available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory 
-policing-maricopa-county. 
 84 Michele Waslin, DHS Rescinds Part of Controversial 287(g) Program in Arizona, 
AM. IMMIG. COUNCIL IMMIGR. IMPACT (June 27, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.com/ 
2012/06/27/dhs-rescinds-part-of-controversial-287g-program-in-arizona/#sthash.7lAG6GA 
9.dpuf; see also Jorge Rivas, Department of Homeland Security and ICE End Sheriff 
Arpaio’s 287(g) Contract, COLORLINES (Dec. 15, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://colorlines.com/ 
archives/2011/12/department_of_homeland_security_and_ice_end_sheriff_arpaios_287g_c
ontract.html. 
 85 DHS did not renew the 287(g) agreements in 2009 and 2011 and stopped its access 
to DHS databases pursuant to Secure Communities in 2011. See Waslin, supra note 84; 
Randal C. Archibold, Immigration Hard-Liner Has His Wings Clipped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2009, at A14; Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 83; Editorial, The Case 
Against Sheriff Arpaio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A24. 
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eventually deported.86 Following a successful equal protection 
and Fourth Amendment lawsuit against the city of Chandler, it 
became a sanctuary city.87 
Immigration scholar Christopher Lasch has compared 
immigration rendition, or deportation, to “a legal system 
resembling slave and criminal rendition” such that it “raises 
questions as to whether immigration rendition is similarly driven 
by race . . . rather than by criminality, as the federal government 
claimed it would be when it launched Secure Communities.”88 
The possibility that the drive to arrest is not crime, but in fact is 
the arrestee’s perceived ethnicity, race, or alienage, implies that 
the equality principles inherent in immigration law should play a 
more significant role. There may be a threat of racial profiling in 
conjunction with pretextual enforcement of immigration law 
when sub-federal agents exercise criminal arresting discretion. 
This was clearly illustrated in Arizona, yet at the same time, 
Arizona highlights the limitations of the law in deterring the 
racial profiling that can result from programs like Secure 
Communities.89  
Based on the history of discriminatory policing in 
immigration law, consideration of equality principles is relevant 
to any assessment of whether a sub-federal immigration law 
should be preempted. The TRUST Act grew, in part, out of a 
concern for discriminatory practices and may decrease the 
likelihood of discriminatory policing. In the absence of measures 
like the TRUST Act, the law falls woefully short with respect to 
deterring or preventing discriminatory immigration practices, 
particularly when sub-federal agents participate in the process.  
 
 86 Corrie Bilke, Note, Divided We Stand, United We Fall: A Public Policy Analysis of 
Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165, 185 
(2009). One scholar’s review of the “Blackmun files”—notes prepared by Justice Blackmun 
in connection with the Lopez-Mendoza decision—indicated that “Chief Justice Burger 
believed that INS was ‘better than most police departments’ at preventing constitutional 
violations from occurring.” Elias, supra note 56, at 1122 (emphasis added). Justice 
Burger’s inclination that local police may be more likely to engage in constitutional 
violations has been echoed by immigrant rights organizations and in the media. ACLU 
Puts Arizona Law Enforcement Agencies on Notice, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 12, 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-puts-arizona-law-enforcement-agencie 
s-notice. 
 87 Bilke, supra note 86, at 186.  
 88 Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 225 (2013). 
 89 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 115 (“As a corollary, preventing discrimination 
before it takes place allows courts to avoid the nearly impossible task that a 
discrimination lawsuit forces judges to undertake—ascertaining what particular state or 
local officials were thinking.”). 
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IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING MEANS OF DETERRING OR 
RESPONDING TO RACIALLY OR ETHNICALLY BIASED PRETEXTUAL 
IMMIGRATION POLICING  
One of the legal vehicles to address discriminatory policing is 
a motion to suppress resulting from a successful Fourth 
Amendment or equal protection claim. Prosecutorial discretion 
could be used as a tool as well, but there is no evidence that it is 
being employed in this manner. However, in the context of 
sub-federal enforcement of immigration law, these remedies are 
no replacement for an affirmative measure like California’s 
TRUST Act that limits the incentive to sub-federal agents to 
engage in racially motivated policing. 
A.  Fourth Amendment and Suppression 
In criminal policing, a law enforcement agent’s violation of 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights may give rise to a 
cause of action resulting in suppression of illegally obtained 
evidence.90 In immigration court, particularly in the context of 
Secure Communities, existing means of addressing racial 
profiling by sub-federal agents in immigration enforcement fall 
short even in the rare instances where suppression is available. 
In the context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has permitted law enforcement agents to use 
ethnicity as one of multiple factors in establishing reasonable 
suspicion that an individual is unlawfully present in the United 
States.91 Thus, not all pretextual stops contested in underlying 
criminal proceedings necessarily constitute Fourth Amendment 
violations.92 While sub-federal agents enforcing criminal laws are 
not permitted to consider ethnicity as a factor in establishing 
reasonable suspicion of a crime, a Fourth Amendment violation 
addressed in immigration courts may not result in exclusion. The 
more restricted approach to the Fourth Amendment is one of 
several reasons that sub-federal agents may not be sufficiently 
 
 90 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (holding that 
evidence obtained illegally is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be used 
against him or her in state criminal prosecutions); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
393 (1914) (ruling that illegal evidence gathered by state officers cannot be used against 
defendants in federal court). 
 91 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (stating use of 
ethnicity as one of many factors by immigration enforcement agents in identifying 
unauthorized migrants); Elias, supra note 56, at 1151. 
 92 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (holding that evidence 
may not be suppressed in criminal proceedings where criminal law enforcement agents 
engage in pretextual stops and race may seep into the calculus). 
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deterred from engaging in pretextual enforcement of immigration 
law, or racial profiling.  
Though Fourth Amendment suppression of evidence is not 
generally available in immigration court, in 1984 the Supreme 
Court ruled in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza that the exclusionary rule 
could apply in immigration court, but only to address “egregious 
violations” of the Fourth Amendment.93 The Circuit Courts have 
since evaluated what constitutes such a violation.94 The 
Lopez-Mendoza Court implied that if violations were widespread, 
the doctrine could be viewed more expansively, and some 
immigration courts have slowly responded accordingly.95 Justice 
O’Connor’s reasoning regarding the need to recognize the 
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings relied on 
“subconstitutional reasoning” to extend, albeit in limited 
circumstances, constitutional protections that otherwise 
previously only applied to citizens.96  
 
 93  See MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 161–62 (discussing Lopez-Mendoza and the role 
of the “egregious violation” principle in allowing judges to protect individuals and 
communities from racially and ethnically discriminatory policing and the notion of 
“comparative culpability,” analogizing workplace raids to discriminatory immigration 
policing where the employer’s wrongdoing against unauthorized migrants may outweigh 
certain characterizations of the alleged noncitizen’s unlawful presence). “Just as 
employment law recognizes the integration of unauthorized migrants into workplace 
communities, the same approach makes sense when unauthorized migrants seek the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
 94 See Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(finding suppression where violation is egregious or widespread); Ghysels-Reals v. U.S. 
Attorney Gen., 418 F. App’x 894, 895–96 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding there is no basis to 
apply the exclusionary rule absent an egregious constitutional violation); 
Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[H]andcuffing an alien 
who resisted arrest is certainly not the ‘egregious’ behavior contemplated by 
Lopez-Mendoza.”); Escobar v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 50, 53–54 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to 
consider the question in the absence of a Fourth Amendment violation altogether); United 
States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2007) (ruling it need not consider 
whether egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment warrant a suppression remedy); 
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that any arrest 
predicated on race is an arrest for “no reason at all” and is per se egregious); United 
States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Lopez-Mendoza does not 
prevent the suppression of all identity-related evidence . . . [it] merely reiterates the 
long-standing rule that a defendant may not challenge a court’s jurisdiction over him or 
her based on an illegal arrest.”); United States v. Navarro -Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (finding no egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment when police asked the 
defendant to identify himself); Mendoza-Solis v. INS, 36 F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the exclusionary rule does not apply in removal proceedings); 
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that “bad faith” 
violations are egregious and occur when “‘evidence is obtained by deliberate violations of 
the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer should have known is in 
violation of the [U.S.] Constitution’”). 
 95 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984); see also Sweeney, supra note 
49, at 274–79 (providing a thoughtful analysis of the reasons to fully apply the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings). 
 96 Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside 
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1763 (2010). 
Do Not Delete 2/16/2015 10:04 AM 
2015] The California TRUST Act 501 
However, the limitations of the egregious violation 
requirement are only one of the deficiencies of the practical 
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in 
immigration court. Suppression is not the best deterrent to racial 
profiling in large part because there is likely an alternate means 
of presenting the evidence sought to be suppressed. In 
immigration removal proceedings, one of the most valuable 
pieces of evidence is proof of the country of origin because 
removability cannot be determined or effectuated absent that 
information. Even if this evidence were suppressed, likely with 
the assistance of counsel (not presently appointed to all indigent 
respondents), it would be otherwise admissible because it is also 
available to law enforcement officers as a result of information 
sharing resulting from Secure Communities and PEP. Thus, 
PEP, and previously Secure Communities, undermine the Fourth 
Amendment’s suppression remedy.97 
B.  Equal Protection 
Equal protection claims alleging discriminatory intent 
require one to prove the intention of the law enforcement agent 
responsible for the alleged violation, which is notoriously hard to 
do. Intent is difficult to decipher because of implicit racial bias98 
and logistical challenges of gathering such data.99 The difficulty 
of proving what was in an officer’s mind when effectuating an 
arrest may deter many legitimate rights violations claims.100 For 
those that pursue such claims, justice may be unattainable and 
the offending party evades consequences and will not be deterred 
from continued profiling. As will be addressed below, this is in 
part why preemption can and has played a role in indirectly 
addressing the harms of racial profiling.101 
At a macro discretionary level, policy makers and politicians 
have demonstrated awareness of the possibility of perceived or 
 
 97 See generally Carrie Rosenbaum, Sub-federal Enforcement of Immigration 
Law: An Introduction to the Problem of Pretextual Enforcement and Inadequate Remedies, 
3 LAWS 61 (2014), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/3/1/61, for a more 
complete discussion on the shortcomings of suppression in removal proceedings. 
 98 See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005), 
for a discussion on the implications of implicit biases in social interactions and the law. 
 99 Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 
61–81 (2001) (explaining that racial profiling equal protection claims are particularly 
hard to prove). 
 100 See MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 115 (referencing the difficulty of discrimination 
lawsuits which require a judge to “ascertain[] what particular state or local officials were 
thinking” when making an arrest). 
 101 Id. at 135 (“When equal protection violations based on discriminatory intent are a 
serious concern but hard to define and prove, a preemption challenge can shift who bears 
the practical risk that the truth is hard to ascertain.”).  
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real discriminatory effects of measures like S.B. 1070 by going to 
great lengths to draft measures that have the appearance of 
racial neutrality.102 This decreases the likelihood of a successful 
equal protection challenge because of the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory intent within the law itself,103 which again, 
highlights the importance of equality concerns within the 
preemption context. And as will be discussed below, the Court 
has allowed concerns about discrimination into their preemption 
analysis.104 What has been labeled “plenary power preemption” 
may act as a gap-filler for the inadequate equal protection 
remedy.105 
C.  Prosecutorial Discretion  
While not historically viewed as a deterrent to improper 
police practices, an early exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
could provide a check on pretextual enforcement or racial 
profiling.106 As a counter to the potential harm caused by 
sub-federal agents’ discretion to arrest, ICE could, even more 
proactively, utilize discretion not to prosecute pursuant to the 
June 2010 and 2011 Morton Memos,107 wherein then-ICE 
 
 102 Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration 
Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2133 (2013). In spite of the courts’ 
avoidance of equality concerns, “political actors have been, and are, aware of the 
underlying connection between immigration law, state and local law, and race.” Id. 
Governor Brewer’s amendment of S.B. 1070 explicitly addresses concerns about racial 
profiling, which is seen as incentivized by drafts of the bill. Id. 
 103 Motomura, supra note 96, at 1743 (“An equal protection challenge would require  
proof of discriminatory intent, but a preemption challenge can persuade some judges 
based on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent.”).  
 104 Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 102, at 2135 & n.289 (“As Professor 
Hiroshi Motomura argues, some courts may already be aware of this latent racial 
dynamic, implicitly folding equality considerations into their preemption analysis when 
striking down state and local laws.”). 
 105 Kerry Abrams, Essay, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 639 (2013) 
(noting that plenary power preemption may allow redress to discrimination or racial 
profiling where claims otherwise may fail or not be brought by unauthorized migrants).  
 106 In June 2010 and June 2011, former ICE Director John Morton issued memos 
instructing ICE Chief Counsel to exercise discretion in removal proceedings with a focus 
on prosecuting dangerous criminals, repeat immigration violators, and suspected 
terrorists. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Emps., Civil 
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Aliens (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Morton, 2010 Memorandum], available at http:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf; Memorandum 
from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office 
Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for 
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton, 
2011 Memorandum], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/pro 
secutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 107 See Morton, 2010 Memorandum, supra note 106; Morton, 2011 Memorandum, 
supra note 106. 
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Director John Morton instructed the ICE Chief Counsel to 
exercise discretion in removal proceedings with a focus on 
prosecuting dangerous criminals, repeat immigration violators, 
and suspected terrorists.108  
While a district attorney might be likely to drop charges 
against a non-citizen stopped for a minor criminal violation, DHS 
has not historically exercised equivalent discretion in the 
immigration context, even where DHS lacks the actual capacity 
to carry out removal. Discretion not to prosecute may be an 
appropriate tool where sub-federal agents engage in behavior 
that falls short of an egregious violation for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and the individual is not a designated enforcement 
target. 
While the 2011 Morton Memo also suggests that discretion 
be exercised where the respondents are litigating civil rights 
violations,109 discretion could be exercised more expansively in 
the context of pretextual arrests where suppression of evidence 
under the exclusionary rule may not be an appropriate or 
available remedy, or where an equal protection110 claim is 
inadequate to provide protection of individual rights.  
Following the letter and spirit of the Morton Memos on 
prosecutorial discretion, ICE trial attorneys could more actively 
exercise prosecutorial discretion where there are indicators that 
the initial criminal arrest was pretextual or marred by racial 
profiling.111 An exercise of discretion would serve the policy goals 
outlined in the 2011 Morton Memo because the agency could 
focus resources on seeking removal of those who pose a public 
safety or national security threat, rather than individuals who 
entered without inspection, and/or overstayed a visa. An exercise 
of discretion in this context could help demonstrate the integrity 
of the immigration enforcement system and discourage 
pretextual enforcement practices.112  
In the absence of adequate means of deterring 
discriminatory immigration policing, communities have 
expressed their resistance to Secure Communities and detainer 
practices by advocating for non-compliance, or by advocating for 
 
 108 See Morton, 2011 Memorandum, supra note 106. 
 109 See id.; see also Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local 
Government Participation in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure 
Communities” Program, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 327, 339 (2011). 
 110 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); see 
Elias, supra note 56, at 1150.  
 111 See generally Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013). 
 112 See Morton, 2011 Memorandum, supra note 106. 
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immigrant integrative ordinances and state laws. Additionally, 
following successful detainer litigation by rights advocates 
resulting in validation of Fourth Amendment claims, sheriffs 
have declared their intent to cease compliance with detainers.113 
As of the spring of 2014, the following cities or counties had 
implemented measures rejecting detainers and/or Secure 
Communities: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Skagit County, Mount 
Vernon, Walla Walla, and Kitsap, Washington; Orange County, 
California; New York, New York; Newark, New Jersey; Cook 
County, Illinois; San Miguel and Boulder, Colorado;114 and the 
states of California and Connecticut.115 By the time of publication 
there may be more cities and counties on this list. 
The California TRUST Act may begin to address the 
discriminatory effects of Secure Communities and PEP.116 
Because the TRUST Act is intended to, and may result in 
minimizing the potential for racial and ethnic profiling in 
policing resulting from Secure Communities, it is in line with 
equality principles and would not be preempted by federal law.  
V. PREEMPTION OF THE TRUST ACT  
Pursuant to traditional preemption principles, the TRUST 
Act should survive a preemption challenge, and by incorporating 
equality principles, it is even clearer that the TRUST Act would 
not be preempted. This section will address traditional express, 
conflict, and implied preemption doctrines and two other forms of 
preemption that I will refer to as “constitutional preemption” and 
“statutory preemption,” versions of which have been applied to 
sub-federal immigration measures. The section will conclude 
with consideration of the role of equality principles in the 
preemption analysis. 
 
 113 Courts in Oregon and Pennsylvania determined that ICE detainer requests are 
not mandatory and are merely requests, and that sheriffs could be liable for constitutional 
violations for holding people pursuant to ICE detainers. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 
634 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50340 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). 
 114 Fear of potentially detaining U.S. citizens as a result of complying with an ICE 
detainer request may be part of the drive towards policies rejecting ICE holds. Colleen 
Slevin, Some Colorado Sheriffs Ending Immigrant Detainers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014, 
7:44 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/04/29/us/ap-us-immigration-detainers 
.html?_r=0. 
 115  CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–7282.5 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h 
(2014). 
 116 Local policies developed in the above cities and counties “reflect a broader kind of 
ideological conflict expressed across the federal-state-local axis: sanctuary laws represent 
instances of local officials staking out political positions in some tension with federal 
intentions . . . in the case of noncooperation laws, the laws reflect a general desire to make 
government institutions accessible to all people.” Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 604 (2008). 
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A.  Traditional “Express” Preemption 
At the outset, the TRUST Act is not expressly preempted 
because Congress has not indicated through an expression of 
federal legislation that it intends to supersede the TRUST Act as 
a related law. No federal statute contains an “express 
preemption” provision preempting the TRUST Act.117  
The non-cooperation or sanctuary policies of the 1980s and 
1990s provide an example of sub-federal non-cooperation laws 
that were expressly preempted. While substantively different 
from the California TRUST Act, the sanctuary policies of the 
1980s provide a context in which to consider sub-federal 
legislation.  
Following the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
communities throughout the United States provided refuge to 
people who came to the United States but had not received, or 
had been denied, refugee status.118 What came to be known as 
“sanctuary cities” represented a form of resistance to federal 
immigration law, or semi-organized non-cooperation.119 Cities 
and counties had informal policies, and some passed 
ordinances.120 In response, in 1996, Congress prohibited local 
government officials or employees from refusing to provide 
information about an individual’s immigration status.121 
Congress’s action preempted existing sanctuary ordinances, 
though there was no litigation of them by the federal 
government.122 If the TRUST Act had attempted to codify 
sanctuary city policies like those preempted by Congress in 1996, 
it could have been subject to express preemption. Instead, the 
TRUST Act was drafted narrowly to only address immigration 
detainers.  
To date, Congress has not expressly prohibited states or 
localities from regulating sub-federal authorities’ prolonged 
detention of non-citizens pursuant to ICE detainers. While 
 
 117 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2012); see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 225, 226–28 (2000) (providing a concise summary of express, field, and conflict 
preemption). 
 118 See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty 
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382–83 (2006); Christopher 
Carlberg, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an Effective Uniform 
Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 740, 
744–45 (2009); Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances 
Restricting Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 50–51 (1994). 
   119 See Pham, supra note 118.  
 120 See id. at 1383.  
 121 See id. at 1376 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2000)); Rodríguez, supra note 116, 
at 601. 
 122 See Pham, supra note 118, at 1384.  
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Congress in 1996 expressly preempted the “non-cooperation” 
sanctuary policies of the 1980s and 1990s, the preempted 
sanctuary laws were markedly different from the TRUST Act. 
Unlike the sanctuary policies, the TRUST Act does not 
directly prevent or interfere with information sharing between 
sub-federal criminal entities and federal immigration authorities. 
Instead, the TRUST Act prevents sub-federal agents from 
detaining certain suspected non-citizens past the time that 
detention might otherwise be authorized in connection with the 
underlying criminal matter.123 The TRUST Act does not prevent 
discovery of a criminal detainee’s immigration status.124 While 
the sanctuary laws prohibited communication regarding 
immigration status, the TRUST Act merely prevents actual 
prolonged detention.  
B.  Conflict Preemption 
The TRUST Act would also not be conflict preempted 
because it does not create “an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”125 
It does not present an actual conflict with federal law, and it is 
not impossible or difficult for an actor to comply with both the 
state and federal laws at the same time.126 No federal law 
mandates sub-federal agents’ detention of suspected non-citizens. 
Such a mandate would violate the Tenth Amendment prohibition 
on commandeering.127  
C.  Implied Preemption 
While implied preemption is less clearly defined and broader 
than express preemption, the TRUST Act would likely also 
survive an implied, field, or obstacle preemption challenge.128 The 
 
 123 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5 (West 2014). 
 124 See Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration 
Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870 , 8 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013) (cataloguing and discussing these laws); Rodríguez, 
supra note 116, at 600–05. 
 125 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 (1940)). 
 126 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also Nelson, supra note 117, at 226–31. 
 127 Lasch, supra note 40, at 290. Section 287.7(a) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations defines detainers as “requests,” and indicates that detainers “advise another 
law enforcement agency” that ICE would like to take custody. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2014). 
The sections of the U.S. Code referenced in the detainer regulations indicate that ICE 
may collaborate with localities that “choose” to participate in immigration enforcement. 
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(11), (c), 1357(d) (2012); see also Letter from Spencer Amdur, 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area, et al., to Cal. Cnty. Counsel, supra 
note 14. 
 128 Field preemption requires Congress to have legislated in a way that was so 
comprehensive as to occupy the field of an issue, where the framework of their legislation 
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TRUST Act is not generally incompatible with immigration 
enforcement regulations and would not be impliedly field 
preempted because it does not prevent DHS from enforcing 
immigration law, nor does it supplement immigration law. 
Instead, it addresses otherwise potentially unlawful extended 
detention of criminal arrestees for immigration purposes. 
Even if the number of detainers or detainer requests has 
declined as a result of the TRUST Act, there is no indication that 
the decrease in detainers has interfered with ICE’s enforcement 
of immigration law. The number of Notices to Appear (NTA) 
being issued annually is still at record high levels.129 The TRUST 
Act would not slow actual rates of deportation, in part because so 
many deportations happen at the border in expedited 
proceedings, and because of immigration court backlogs.130 
Moreover, regardless of the number of apprehensions or orders of 
removal, DHS only has the capacity to deport about 300,000 to 
400,000 people annually. 
Instead of interfering with enforcement, the TRUST Act may 
result in a decrease in superfluous immigration detention of 
non-priority non-citizens, a cost borne by local law enforcement 
agencies, and subsequently ICE once the non-citizen is 
transferred to ICE custody. The TRUST Act may also increase 
the proportion of removals of higher priority offenders as 
identified by DHS.131 Thus instead of interfering with 
enforcement, it may increase efficiency and cost effectiveness. 
Additionally, even if the TRUST Act decreased the use of 
immigration detainers, it would not interfere with the 
information-sharing component of Secure Communities. Even 
after implementation of the TRUST Act, if a local law 
enforcement agent does not comply with the detainer request, the 
data-sharing component of Secure Communities, and now PEP, 
 
is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for states to supplement it,” or where the 
federal system of laws would “preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” 
Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 70). The Supremacy Clause 
disallows state laws that “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 129 See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 
2013, TRACIMMIGR. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/. 
 130 Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in 
Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_back 
log/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2014); FY 2013 REMOVALS, supra note 33 (reporting that in FY 
2013, of 368,644 removals, 235,093 were apprehended and removed at the border and 
133,551 were apprehended within the United States).  
 131 Enforcement Without Focus: Non-violent Offenders Caught in the US Immigration 
Enforcement System, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/printpdf/2925; KOHLI, MARKOWITZ & CHAVEZ, supra 
note 41. 
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remains in place because the biometric data will still be 
transmitted to DHS.132  
Preemption in the immigration context is somewhat 
doctrinally muddled133 and therefore necessitates additional 
consideration. The rest of this section will attempt to set forth 
two additional, more nuanced preemption methodologies relevant 
to the immigration context to offer additional insight into 
whether an integrative measure like the TRUST Act would be 
preempted. One model emphasizes the federal government’s 
exclusive power and control over immigration pursuant to the 
plenary power doctrine,134 which I will refer to as “constitutional 
preemption,” and the other, “statutory preemption,” favors a 
power-sharing approach enabling more of a role for sub-federal 
entities in legislating. These frameworks are merely two general 
approaches and do not create a dichotomy, but instead define a 
spectrum of views on the preemption doctrine. This next section 
will outline these two methodologies within discussions of 
immigration preemption before finally moving to consideration of 
civil rights preemption and “equality principles,” and the role 
they may play within either framework for assessing the 
constitutionality of the TRUST Act.  
D.  Constitutional Preemption 
Federal exclusivity preemption, or what I refer to as 
“constitutional preemption,” is based on the federal government’s 
unique power over certain matters. Federal exclusivity in 
immigration law is not established explicitly as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine, but is instead based on implied powers. 
Only Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 gives Congress the power to 
“establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”135 Otherwise, the 
federal government’s power over immigration has been 
 
 132 Once the FBI checks the fingerprints of an arrestee, the FBI automatically sends 
them to DHS, and ICE determines if the person is subject to removal. Secure 
Communities however, does not authorize local agents to issue Notices to Appear, as the 
287(g) regulations did. Secure Communities, supra note 31. 
 133 Abrams, supra note 105, at 626. 
 134 Id. at 601, 615 (discussing preemption following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Arizona v. United States case and helping to make sense of contemporary immigration 
preemption doctrine by suggesting that the Court will apply field or structural 
preemption to consider or invalidate a state statute that regulates core immigration 
functions (admissions and removals) and what Abrams terms “plenary power 
preemption,” used to invalidate alienage laws, and describing plenary power preemption 
in part as a manifestation of immigration exceptionalism as linked to structural 
immigration preemption concerns regarding the unique nature of foreign affairs).  
 135  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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interpreted as implied.136 The power of Congress to admit or 
deport non-citizens is considered “plenary,” or absolute.  
The federal government’s plenary power is what gives rise to 
federal exclusivity in the context of preemption of sub-federal 
immigration laws.137 The plenary power doctrine has evolved 
since its establishment pursuant to the Chinese exclusion cases 
in 1889 and 1893, where the Court held in Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States and Chae Chan Ping v. United States that 
the federal government has exclusive power over admissions and 
removals.138   
Perhaps most recently and relevantly, the Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in Arizona v. United States reaffirmed the 
exclusivity of the federal government in immigration law.139 In 
spite of the critiques of federal exclusivity, some contend that it 
remains relevant as a tool to stem “the discriminatory powers of 
the states on immigrants,”140 particularly in the absence of civil 
rights preemption or application of equality principles within the 
preemption analysis. 
Unlike S.B. 1070, the TRUST Act does not regulate in an 
area that is a core immigration matter (admissions or removals), 
compared to the main thrust of S.B. 1070, which was clearly 
revealed in Section 1 as Arizona’s immigration policy.141 Instead 
it only indirectly concerns enforcement, and relies on a typical 
exercise of state police power by identifying non-citizens and 
limiting their continued incarceration. The impact of the TRUST 
Act can be characterized as ancillary to immigration. While a 
court could use the national sovereignty rationale from structural 
preemption and plenary power preemption and characterize the 
TRUST Act as an immigration regulation in disguise, even 
 
 136 LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 10, at 113–30. 
 137 Id. at 113–14. 
 138 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 10, at 195 (explaining 
the evolution of the plenary power doctrine). 
 139 Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State 
Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2–3 (2013) 
(noting the Court’s support for federal primacy in the context of immigration 
enforcement); Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 580–81 (2012). 
 140 Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 613; Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1102–15 (2004) (discussing 
the threat of racial profiling by state and local law enforcement). 
 141 See Abrams, supra note 105 (discussing the Court’s application of plenary power 
or structural preemption based in part on distinguishing alienage and immigration laws).  
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though it is otherwise an exercise of state police power, this 
seems unlikely.142 
Constitutional preemption does not necessarily indicate that 
any sub-federal law, whether immigrant integrative or 
anti-immigrant, would be preempted. While S.B. 1070 was 
preempted based largely on a federal exclusivity-oriented 
preemption analysis,143 as will be discussed in the next section, 
where civil rights and equality principles are incorporated into 
the preemption analysis, an immigrant integrative sub-federal 
measure should survive a preemption challenge. 
Scholars have questioned the rationale behind federal 
exclusivity in preemption analyses of state laws concerning 
immigration.144 Some suggest that the foreign policy rationale 
justifying federal exclusivity is no longer relevant,145 or that 
federal exclusivity is no longer appropriate as a result of the shift 
towards increased power sharing between the federal 
government and sub-federal entities, and the 
immigrant-integration role of localities.146 Additionally, prior to 
1840 the states played a direct role in regulating immigration.147  
E.  Statutory Preemption 
Statutory preemption may allow more room for state and 
local governments to legislate in the field of immigration law148 
because it recognizes some degree of shared authority between 
 
 142 Id. at 637 (explaining that in preemption cases with state alienage statute 
challenges, the Court has taken the national sovereignty issues from structural and 
plenary power preemption to suggest that the state statue is an immigration regulation in 
disguise even though it otherwise appeared to be an exercise of a traditional police 
power). The author suggests (and agrees) that based on Abrams’s rationale, the Court 
would, however, be more likely to invalidate a sub-federal law using this rationale if the 
law were discriminatory, because in alienage cases the Supreme Court “deviates from the 
usual preemption doctrine and applies plenary power preemption,” in part as a substitute 
for an inadequate equal protection doctrine. Id. 
 143 The author acknowledges that this is an oversimplification and extensive 
scholarly work has addressed the Court’s preemption analysis.  
 144 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 57; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1627 (1997); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration 
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 789 (2008). 
 145 Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-sovereignties, 35 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 121, 161–74 (1994). 
 146 Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 600–05. 
 147 States had used their constitutionally derived police power to regulate 
immigration until about 1840 when the courts started placing limits on their regulation of 
immigration. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 180–83, 189–90 (1987); GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21–23, 
31–37 (1996). 
 148 Huntington, supra note 144, at 792–93. 
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national and sub-national levels of government.149 The 
Immigration and Nationality Act can statutorily preempt 
sub-federal laws governing admission and removal of 
non-citizens.150 Statutory preemption is neither express nor 
implied preemption, but a separate and distinct view of the 
preemption doctrine.151 
New configurations of the term “immigration federalism” 
may be parallel to statutory preemption in that they recognize 
simultaneous engagement of federal and sub-federal actors in 
immigration regulation regardless of whether the rulemaking is 
integrative or anti-immigrant.152 
Statutory preemption recognizes sub-national authority 
arising in part pursuant to the police power to regulate health 
and safety.153 Because the federal government has traditionally 
dominated the field of immigration law, if a sub-federal law were 
preempted, it will most likely be field preempted.154  
Statutory preemption recognizes that the foreign affairs 
justification for federal exclusivity may be less relevant because 
foreign powers interact directly with sub-federal actors,155 and 
nations understand that the actions of one state or locality may 
not reflect the will of the federal government.156 It is also less 
possible now than in the past to exclude states and localities from 
activities with foreign affairs impact.157 At the same time, leaders 
of other countries recognize that sub-federal entities within the 
United States have the power to act in ways that may be at odds 
 
 149 Id. at 810 n.90 (citing Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 131 (2004)); id. at 826.  
 150 Id. at 825. 
 151 Id. at 842. 
 152 Elias, supra note 34, at 708. 
 153 Huntington, supra note 144, at 825. 
 154 Within the context of statutory preemption is the question of whether federal 
rules expressly or impliedly preempt sub-federal rules. Id. at 850 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983)). 
Implied field preemption is a type of statutory preemption. For more on statutory and 
implied field preemption, see id. at 850–52. 
 155 See Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 615–16 (citing Judith Resnik, Law’s 
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of 
Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1639–43 (2006)); Spiro, supra note 145, at 162–63 (showing 
how states and localities interact with international entities). 
 156 See Amanda Mangaser, State and Local Regulation of Immigration and 
Immigrants: A Connecticut Case Study 12 (Dec. 17, 2013) (Student Legal History Paper, 
Yale Law School), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1027&context=student_legal_history_papers (citing Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 
571). 
 157 Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 615 (“[I]t is no longer clear that it is possible or even 
desirable to exclude states and localities from activities that implicate foreign affairs.”).  
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with federal policies.158 Under this preemption model, the 
TRUST Act should not be preempted because it should not have 
an adverse impact on foreign affairs, as it is immigrant 
integrative, and regardless, it is reasonable to presume that 
other nations will not attribute the TRUST Act to the federal 
government.  
Historically, prior to the era of the plenary power doctrine, 
states played a role in immigration.159 Today, sub-federal entities 
play a significant role in integrating immigrants through public 
services such as hospitals, schools, and the workplace.160 There is 
a “de facto” power sharing occurring between these levels of 
government and the federal government.161 At the same time, 
even if federal exclusivity were removed from the analysis of 
state immigration laws, civil rights preemption or active 
incorporation of equality principles would facilitate sub-federal 
integrative measures while casting more of a shadow on 
disintegrative ones. In other words, it could be possible to move 
away from federal exclusivity in preemption considerations while 
still protecting civil and individual rights. 
Within this context, the federal government should not 
require states and localities to participate in immigration 
enforcement where those bodies are attempting to integrate.162 
However, failure to recognize immigrant equality principles as an 
essential part of preemption analyses would still result in 
creation of anti-immigrant zones where states and localities 
choose to create discriminatory or enforcement-oriented 
measures. Some scholars suggest that permitting states to enact 
anti-immigrant measures may help facilitate the eventuality of 
 
 158 Instead of suggesting the elimination of federal exclusivity or “immigration 
federalism,” others, such as Peter Schuck, have suggested that federalism need not mean 
“constitutional state sovereignty,” where “state authority inheres in the constitutional 
settlement among the states and the people, whereby only limited powers . . . were 
delegated to the national government while all other powers were reserved to the states 
and the people.” Schuck, supra note 144, at 66. He explains that instead, “state 
participation can take many different forms: administration and/or enforcement of 
federally-established rules and policies; policy development and implementation within 
parameters (more or less constraining) set by federal policymakers; federal funding of 
states to develop their own policies; and many other collaborative (though inevitably 
conflicting) arrangements,” and immigration federalism occurs when “states operate 
under, and are obliged to respect, federal immigration policies and supervision.” Id. at 
66−67. He also notes that this is what Peter Spiro calls “cooperative federalism.” Id. at 67 
(citing Peter J. Spiro, Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends, 167 INT’L SOC. 
SCI. J. 67, 67–68 (2001)). 
 159 See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 10, at 110–30.  
 160 See Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 571–72, 609–17. 
 161 Id. at 610. 
 162 Id. at 631. 
Do Not Delete 2/16/2015 10:04 AM 
2015] The California TRUST Act 513 
their independent decision to cease such practices.163 However, 
even if this were true, because the preemption analysis can and 
should address issues of civil and individual rights, we need not 
permit such potentially harmful and optimistic experimentation.  
The statutory preemption model would still permit analysis 
of individual rights because the Constitution’s concern with 
structural issues includes not only the relationship among the 
branches of sub-national and national government, but also 
individual rights.164 The allocation of authority can be informed 
by questions of individual rights and both can be considered in 
the preemption analysis, even if federalism and individual rights 
are fundamentally different questions.165 However, I would 
suggest that federalism and individual rights are not 
fundamentally different questions, as was suggested by the 
Court’s interpretation of the role of the Civil Rights Act in 
preemption in Takahashi v. California Fish and Game 
Commission,166 Hines v. Davidowitz,167 and Graham 
v. Richardson.168 
VI. EQUALITY PRINCIPLES AND CIVIL RIGHTS PREEMPTION 
For the purposes of this Article, the “equality principle” 
refers to the constitutional ideal of equality derived from the 
rationales of the Plyler v. Doe and Brown v. Board of Education 
Courts,169 combined with the notion that everyone in the United 
States should be treated equally whether their presence in the 
United States is authorized or not. Immigration scholar Hiroshi 
Motomura has written extensively about the notion of 
“Americans in Waiting,” or “future members of American 
society.” “Americans in Waiting” may be unauthorized migrants 
who are already members of and participants in American 
 
 163 Id. at 639 (“[T]his transition from fear to acceptance is more likely to occur not 
only if the local debate over immigration is permitted to run its course (subject to 
generally applicable laws), but also if the localities that adopt these [anti-immigrant] 
ordinances come to feel the consequences of excluding immigrants from their 
communities—namely, the economic consequences of pushing immigrants out of places 
they helped revitalize.”). Rodríguez responds by questioning whether once immigrant 
labor has helped revitalize a locale, might the immigrant contribution be dismissed and  
the population be just as unwelcome as they were initially, as if they had made no 
measurable or perceivable contribution. Id. at 639–40.  
 164 Huntington, supra note 144, at 793–94, 828, 834–37. 
 165 Id. at 794. 
 166 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 167 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 168 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 169 See MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at  88 (discussing the Plyler decision which treated 
Texas schoolchildren as future members of U.S. society because of a concern about their 
integration ability and consequences for them, and the United States as a whole, absent 
such consideration).  
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society based on their presence and participation as consumers, 
workers, and beyond.170 Thus it is reasonable to propose that 
future Americans should be entitled to certain rights and 
protections. Accordingly, by incorporating this kind of equality 
principle into the preemption analysis, an integrative sub-federal 
law pertaining to immigration or alienage171 should not be 
preempted. 
Similarly, immigration scholar Lucas Guttentag discusses 
and defines an “equality principle” by focusing on civil rights 
preemption as derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which 
prohibits discrimination based on “alienage.”172 Guttentag 
examines the role of this equality principle in the context of 
assessing sub-federal immigration laws. Application of this 
equality principle also suggests that an immigrant integrative 
sub-federal law that furthers the immigrant equality principle 
derived from the Civil Rights Act would not be preempted.  
The next section will employ a combined equality principle 
based on the notion of applying principles of non-discrimination 
to all present in the United States irrespective of immigration 
status, and application of the civil rights equality principle 
derived from the Civil Rights Act to establish a relevant 
framework to assess the TRUST Act. 
A.  The Equality Principle Derived from the Civil Rights Act of 
1870 
While the Constitution creates what is known as the 
federalist structure, the role of individual rights expands beyond 
equal protection, into preemption analyses.173 The 1866 and 1870 
 
 170 Id. at 86–112. 
 171 Unless otherwise noted, I do not distinguish between immigration and alienage 
laws for the purposes of my discussion.  
 172 Guttentag, supra note 124. 
 173 Huntington, supra note 144, at 837 (explaining that “the Constitution also is 
concerned centrally with the rights of individuals” at the same time that it creates the 
federalist structure). The author notes that there is an interesting interplay between the 
appropriateness of preemption as opposed to equal protection in addressing 
discrimination and federalism. Though there are reasonable arguments for why the Equal 
Protection Clause should apply uniformly, with the same level of review at the state and 
federal level, consideration of individual rights has figured into preemption analyses and 
may rightfully belong there as well. Scholars have suggested that equality principles 
might be better recognized and the equal protection doctrine might be more effective if 
federal exclusivity were eliminated in the context of equal protection claims which result 
in differing levels of scrutiny depending on whether the action arises in state or federal 
contexts. Elimination of federal exclusivity would mean that alienage classifications 
would be subject to a higher level of scrutiny than they are now at the federal level. 
However, equal protection is still an after-the-fact remedy, as opposed to recognizing 
integrative state immigration measures as not subject to preemption by taking into 
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Civil Rights Acts included “alien” or non-citizen 
anti-discrimination principles which were codified in the United 
States Code and Immigration and Nationality Act, though they 
eventually found their way into a different section.174 Congress’s 
intent to acknowledge and potentially prevent discrimination 
against non-citizens is evidenced by the express provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act, codified at Title 42 of the U.S. Code section 
1981, and first set forth in section 16 of the 1870 Act. The 
provisions state in relevant part, “‘all persons’ shall have the 
same right as ‘white citizens’ in ‘every State and Territory’ to 
certain enumerated rights.”175 From approximately 1886 to 1971, 
the Supreme Court referenced this provision in preempting 
discriminatory sub-federal legislation.176  
B.  The Supreme Court’s Use of Civil Rights Preemption and 
Equality Principles to Protect Non-citizens 
In prior decades, up until approximately 1971, the Supreme 
Court actively recognized the anti-immigrant discrimination 
components of federal law when preempting state statutes.177 In 
this respect, immigration scholar Lucas Guttentag and others 
have focused on the Court’s decisions in the 1866, 1941, 1948, 
and 1971 cases of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,178 Hines v. Davidowitz,179 
Takahashi v. California Fish and Game Commission,180 and 
Graham v. Richardson,181 respectively. I will briefly reference 
some of the instances where the Court considered individual 
rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, addressing their 
 
consideration equality principles, and considering the possible preemption of 
anti-immigrant enforcement measures that run contrary to equality principles.  
 174 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 20–26 (examining the role “equality principles” were 
intended to play in preemption of sub-federal measures affecting non-citizens, as well as 
the reason the Court has not emphasized civil rights preemption for the past several 
decades—primarily because of the codification of the Civil Rights Act in disparate parts of 
the U.S. Code and elsewhere, and partially because of the relationship between the Equal 
Protection Clause and preemption). The “alien non-discrimination” provision, section 1977 
(originally section 16 of the 1870 Act), became codified at 8 U.S.C. section 41, in what was 
the “Civil Rights” chapter of the Aliens and Citizenship Act as was first published in 
1926. The current version is located at 42 U.S.C. sections 1981–1983. Id. at 23; see 8 
U.S.C. §§ 41–43 (1926). After enactment of the first comprehensive set of immigration 
laws into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952, the two civil rights 
provisions from the 1866 and 1870 Acts ended up in the Health and Welfare title, and 
were no longer contained in Title 8, the Immigration title.  
 175 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 10 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 
16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012))).  
 176 Id.  
 177 Preemption was generally of “alienage” laws rather than “immigration” ones, but 
an in-depth discussion is not necessary for the purposes of the following discussion.  
 178 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 179 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 180 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 181 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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characterization of the relationship between equal protection and 
preemption where relevant. These cases demonstrate the 
instances where the Court recognized equality principles of the 
Civil Rights Act to preempt a sub-federal law. The same 
rationales apply in assessing the TRUST Act. 
In 1886, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of a San Francisco ordinance barring laundries of wooden 
construction because the ordinance was applied in a racially 
discriminatory manner.182 While the Court’s holding in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins183 relied on equal protection grounds, the Court 
referenced the 1870 Act explicitly.184 Yick Wo was subsequently 
cited by other courts in striking down state law as discriminatory 
on preemption grounds.185  
In Hines v. Davidowitz the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Pennsylvania statute creating a state crime for a non-citizen’s 
failure to comply with federal registration requirements, and 
criminalizing unauthorized employment.186 In preempting the 
measure, the Court validated the plaintiff’s claims that the state 
law conflicted with constitutional rights and the 1870 Civil 
Rights Act.187 The Hines Court specifically acknowledged the 
1870 Civil Rights Act’s “non-discrimination mandate” tied to 
federal immigration laws for the purposes of preemption 
analysis.188  
In Takahashi v. California Fish and Game Commission,189 
the Court invalidated a California state law prohibiting issuance 
of a commercial fishing license to an “alien Japanese” on civil 
rights preemption grounds.190 The Court preempted the law, 
finding the 1870 Civil Rights Act anti-discrimination protections 
inextricable from Congress’s comprehensive immigration plan 
even though it did not rule that the law violated equal 
protection.191 The Takahashi ruling demonstrated that the Civil 
Rights Act could serve as the basis for invalidating a state law to 
further equality principles, even where the state law is not 
invalid pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
standards.192  
 
 182 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356–59, 374. 
 183 Id. at 369. 
 184 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 28 (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374).  
 185 Id. at 28–29 & n.106.  
 186 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 60–74 (1941). 
 187 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 30 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 69). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 190 Id. at 410–20. 
 191 Id. at 419; Guttentag, supra note 124, at 34. 
 192 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 34. 
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In 1971 the Court invalidated state welfare statutes 
restricting eligibility of immigrants for state benefits programs 
on equal protection grounds,193 and simultaneously on civil rights 
preemption grounds.194 In Graham v. Richardson, the Court 
found that the state laws were preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause195 based on immigrant protections of section 16 of the 
Civil Rights Act,196 as well as an overarching implied conflict 
with federal immigration law.197 Thus the Graham v. Richardson 
decision signified the Court’s acknowledgement that preemption 
could stem from the Civil Rights Act itself in the immigration 
context and not just the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act.198 
When considering the validity of a state immigration-related 
law, the Court has recognized the importance of the relationship 
between the state law and equality principles of federal law.199 
Yet in the decades following Graham, where the Court has 
invalidated a sub-federal law, it has done so based on foreign 
affairs related preemption or equal protection considerations.  
Several recent preemption cases provide examples of 
instances where the Court relied on non-civil rights preemption 
grounds or equal protection.200 A brief consideration of how the 
courts have strayed from civil rights preemption helps frame the 
discussion regarding why the Court could and should consider 
individual rights in the preemption analysis of both immigrant 
integrative or discriminatory state or sub-federal measures.  
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court invalidated what was 
found to be a state attempt at enforcing immigration law by 
denying a public education to unauthorized migrant children.201 
The Court ruled on equal protection grounds rather than finding 
that the federal law preempted the Texas statute.202 Justice 
Brennan noted that the Constitution required protecting 
undocumented children from discriminatory laws, and that 
 
 193 Id. at 29 n.106 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971)). 
 194 Id. at 35 (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 366–68). 
 195 Id. at 36 n.151 (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 376–77). 
 196 Id. at 36 (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 377). 
 197 Id. (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 378).  
 198 Id. at 37–38. 
 199 Id. at 36–37 (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 377).  
 200 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that discrimination against 
undocumented children is subject to heightened scrutiny in the equal protection analysis); 
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).  
 201 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 202 Id. at 210 n.8. 
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preemption decisions may be influenced by a concern about 
“negative externalities.”203 However, the furthest the Court went 
in addressing the possibility of civil rights preemption was the 
suggestion, within their equal protection analysis, that states 
and localities have less authority than the federal government to 
discriminate based on immigration status.204  
Similarly, in Farmers Branch, the Supreme Court also found 
a state law conflicted with federal immigration law where it 
restricted lawfully present non-citizens’ ability to rent housing.205 
The Supreme Court found the state law preempted by federal 
immigration law, but did not address civil rights preemption.206 
While the Court cited a case where it had struck down a state 
law which interfered with the ability of an inhabitant to earn a 
living based on race or nationality,207 it did not rely on the 
individual rights protections of the 1870 Civil Rights Act in its 
preemption analysis.  
The plaintiffs in Lozano v. City of Hazleton brought 
preemption and equal protection claims alleging that two 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania ordinances were discriminatory and 
preempted by federal immigration law.208 The ordinances 
required proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status in 
order to work or rent housing.209 On remand following the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 
and Arizona v. United States, the Third Circuit determined that 
the broad employment and housing provisions of the ordinance 
were impliedly preempted.210  
The Hazleton court’s preemption of the employment 
provisions was based in significant part on the Hazleton 
ordinance’s omission of protections against discrimination.211 In 
passing the 1996 Act expanding workplace enforcement, 
 
 203 Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 165 n.348 
(2014) (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218–19) (“[There is a] concern over the development of ‘a 
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as 
a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents’ . . . . (citation omitted) ‘We cannot ignore the 
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to 
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.’”). 
 204 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 117, 137. 
 205 Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524.  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 559 (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)). 
 208 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
 209 Id. at 301. 
 210 Id. at 300. 
 211 See MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 108–11, 125–29. 
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Congress had been careful to include anti-discrimination 
measures. In finding the employment provisions preempted, the 
Hazleton court specifically cited the lack of similar protections in 
the Hazleton legislation.212  
Underlying the court’s conflict preemption analysis was the 
notion that the ordinances were impliedly conflict preempted by 
federal immigration law because they interfered with the way in 
which federal immigration authorities exercise discretion in 
immigration enforcement.213 Even though the plaintiffs provided 
ample evidence that the ordinances resulted in potential racial 
and ethnic discrimination against unauthorized migrants and 
Latino U.S. citizens, the court did not apply civil rights 
preemption.214  
In 2012, the Court relied on foreign-affairs preemption to 
address underlying concerns about discrimination in United 
States v. Arizona. This kind of disingenuous reliance on 
foreign-affairs preemption215 has caused critics to argue for the 
end of federal exclusivity in preemption analyses and to suggest 
more direct consideration of the role of individual rights and 
recognition of the rights of non-citizens.216 The Arizona Court 
referenced Hines v. Davidowitz regarding the possibility of 
“unnecessary harassment of aliens” (whom the government may 
not seek to deport) as a threat to federal, presumably civil rights, 
interests.217 The Court’s reference to the possibility of 
mistreatment of non-citizens based on race by sub-federal agents 
was, however, couched in a reference to foreign affairs concerns. 
Instead, the Court could have addressed the issue of 
discrimination by employing civil rights preemption.218 
 
 212 See Motomura, supra note 96, at 1734. The Lozano court might not have found the 
ordinance preempted had the plaintiffs not brought forth evidence of racial and ethnic 
bias. Id. at 1743. 
 213 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 121, 123. 
 214 Id. at 133; Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176, 195 & n.19 (3d Cir. 
2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 
484–85, 508–10, 538–42, 556–62 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 724 F.3d 297 
(3d Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
 215 A more complete discussion of foreign-affairs preemption is beyond the scope of 
this Article, with the exception of references made here pertaining to the relationship 
between foreign-affairs preemption and constitutional preemption or preemption 
influenced by the plenary power doctrine. 
 216 Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of 
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 421 (2013). 
 217 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–99 (2012) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)). 
 218 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 9 (citing Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506) (noting that 
the Arizona Court did not address the discrimination concerns based on the prohibition on 
alienage discrimination creating an avenue for civil rights preemption, based on the 1870 
Civil Rights Act); id. at 30 (discussing Hines v. Davidowitz, which the Arizona Court also 
cited in relying on the foreign affairs power as a source of immigration authority to 
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Many scholars have criticized the Court’s failure to address 
S.B. 1070’s potential for harassment of immigrants as a civil 
rights matter. Professor Guttentag critiqued the Court’s analysis 
as “significant but incomplete” for failing to address this issue in 
the preemption analysis, and for only considering the harm of 
discrimination to foreign relations, as opposed to those suffering 
the discrimination themselves.219 Other scholars have noted that 
the Court has demonstrated a “‘disregard [of] the 
antidiscrimination goals of federal immigration policy’ and a 
‘deemphasiz[ing of] antidiscrimination norms’” within federal 
immigration enforcement policy and practice.220 Indeed, the 
Arizona Court was “unwilling or unprepared to embrace civil 
rights issues in its preemption analysis.”221 Yet, at least one 
scholar has optimistically proposed that even without addressing 
equality principles or civil rights preemption, the Arizona ruling 
is indicative of a “new immigration federalism” that will allow 
states and localities to engage in integrative, or “inclusionary 
rulemaking,” while limiting measures that would exclude 
immigrants.222 Irrespective of the Court’s failure to address 
equality principles or civil rights, the Arizona decision may stand 
for the principle that states cannot engage in anti-unauthorized 
migrant “immigration” (as opposed to “alienage”) legislating if 
the measure interferes with the federal government’s plenary 
power over immigration.223  
While equality principles played a role, civil rights 
preemption did not prevail in the determination of whether 
Arizona labor regulations were preempted in Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting.224 In 2011 the Supreme Court held in 
Whiting that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) did not expressly preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act 
provision allowing suspension and/or revocation of business 
licenses for employers who knowingly or intentionally employ 
undocumented workers lacking work authorization, or for 
 
consider invalidation of state discriminatory laws); id. at 31 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 70) 
(emphasizing that Justice Black’s discussion of preemption in Hines “recognized the 
equality rights and liberty interests of the immigrants themselves that underscores the 
immigrant equality element of federal law”).  
 219 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 9–10. 
 220 Lasch, supra note 40, at 292. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Elias, supra note 34, at 743–47. 
 223 Id. at 719 (explaining that the Arizona decision prohibits sub-federal 
anti-immigrant “immigration” legislation while permitting sub-federal integrative 
“alienage” measures because the decision contemplated “immigration” laws and not 
“alienage” measures); see also Kit Johnson & Peter Spiro, Debate, Immigration 
Preemption After United States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 105 (2012), 
available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-100.pdf. 
 224 See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
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adopting a provision that mirrored federal law mandating use of 
the federal E-Verify database. 
Plaintiffs had alleged in part that the law condoned 
discrimination against those perceived as appearing “foreign 
looking.”225 Justice Roberts stated that there was no reason to 
suspect that the law would cause discrimination against 
Hispanics “lawfully” in the United States.226 Roberts’s concluding 
remarks on preemption indicated that implied preemption does 
not permit a “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state 
statute is in tension with federal objectives,’” and that civil rights 
or discrimination concerns could not establish the requisite high 
threshold for finding preemption in that case.227 Justice Breyer 
elicited civil rights preemption by countering that the law 
disrupts a careful balance between competing Congressional 
goals and “seriously threatens the federal Act’s 
antidiscriminatory objectives” by not including 
anti-discrimination protections present in the federal 
immigration law while increasing penalties for hiring 
unauthorized workers, thus increasing the chances of 
discrimination.228  
Hiroshi Motomura has aptly recognized that the relationship 
between equal protection and preemption is, in part, that 
preemption steps in where equal protection fails.229 These cases, 
even those where the equal protection claim was validated, 
present instances where the Court could have employed civil 
rights preemption. Rather than relying on ill-suited or ineffective 
tools to address rights issues, the courts should resurrect civil 
rights preemption whether they take a view of preemption that 
favors federal exclusivity, or statutory preemption.  
After the passage of the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Act, up 
until about 1971, the Supreme Court explicitly considered civil 
 
 225 For an insightful discussion of Whiting, see Hiroshi Motomura’s 2014 
book: Immigration Outside the Law. MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 119–20, 124–25. 
Motomura discusses preemption in Whiting and Hazleton and the courts’ omission of 
consideration of the way in which states indirectly enforce immigration law by making 
living and working in a state exceptionally difficult. Id. He contrasts these decisions to the 
Arizona decision, which acknowledged this issue in the context of their preemption 
decision. Id. at 124–25. 
 226 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1970. 
 227 Id. (“Implied preemption analysis does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry 
into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives’; such an endeavor ‘would 
undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law.’ 
Our precedents ‘establish that a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be 
preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act.’ That threshold is not met 
here.”) (citations omitted). 
 228 Id. at 1990 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 229 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 136. 
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rights and discrimination concerns in the context of their 
preemption analysis. Immigrant equality is a part of Supremacy 
Clause analysis, and as a part of the preemption analysis, 
“equality adds a ground for preempting laws that cause 
discrimination and for validating measures that promote 
immigrant integration and protection.”230 Equality concerns can 
play a role in addressing whether a sub-federal measure should 
be deemed preempted.  
Because statutory preemption permits power sharing 
between the federal government and sub-federal authorities, the 
TRUST Act would likely not be preempted pursuant to a 
statutory preemption analysis.231 When considering whether the 
TRUST Act would be statutorily preempted, the analysis would 
depend on whether the Act was field preempted. As discussed 
above, Congress’s legislation in the field of immigration law may 
be comprehensive; however, the TRUST Act regulates within a 
state’s police power, concerning incarceration in a state prison or 
jail, using state resources. Thus, even though federal 
immigration law occupies a comprehensive field, it does not 
preempt the TRUST Act.  
If equality principles were incorporated into a statutory 
preemption analysis, the Court could also look to the field of civil 
rights law. When considering the TRUST Act in the context of 
field preemption incorporating federal civil rights law, the 
TRUST Act is even less likely to be preempted. The integrative 
components of the Act have the potential to protect individual 
rights by counteracting the potential discriminatory threats of 
Secure Communities, which suggest its harmony with the field of 
federal civil rights law. 
In the context of shared authority between federal and 
sub-federal law enforcement agents, the historic prevalence of 
racial discrimination in law enforcement necessitates 
incorporation of equality principles into the preemption analysis. 
Even if shared authority between the federal government and the 
sub-federal entities suggests the need to move away from 
preemption of sub-federal immigration-related measures, 
application of equality principles would result in preemption of 
discriminatory enforcement measures, but survival of inclusive 
state or sub-federal laws like the TRUST Act. Regardless of 
 
 230 Guttentag, supra note 124, at 4–5. 
 231 Huntington, supra note 144, at 832. Statutory preemption does not eliminate the 
applicability of express or implied preemption. Id. at 824–25. Field preemption is a type of 
statutory preemption, and considers the extent to which the federal government has 
regulated the entire field and as a result, prohibited sub-federal entities from playing a 
role. Id. at 851.  
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whether a statutory preemption or federal exclusivity model is 
used, as long as essential equality principles are incorporated 
into the analysis, the TRUST Act would not be preempted.  
Federal exclusivity generally suggests that a sub-federal 
measure may be more likely to be preempted than under 
statutory preemption. However, if equality principles were 
incorporated under a federal exclusivity preemption analysis, the 
TRUST Act and similar immigrant integration measures should 
survive a federal exclusivity preemption challenge. Because 
Secure Communities has the potential to incentivize or present a 
threat of discrimination,232 and because it undermines the few 
existing and already inadequate remedies to discrimination, such 
as Fourth Amendment suppression,233 equality principles should 
be considered when evaluating the possible preemption of 
measures like the TRUST Act.  
One of the reasons for maintaining federal exclusivity in 
immigration law may not be the foreign affairs rationale, but 
instead may be to ensure that sub-federal law enforcement 
agents do not have the power to discriminate based on race or 
national origin, including in determining who is an American.234 
Federal exclusivity has the potential to prevent the erosion of 
anti-discrimination principles resulting from increasing 
involvement of sub-federal agents in immigration enforcement.235  
A broad view of preemption may also be important because 
the federal government’s power to exercise discretion in 
enforcement is an important part of federal immigration 
doctrine.236 The Court has struck down sub-federal measures as 
 
 232 As noted by Lucas Guttentag, it is the threat of potential discrimination and 
harassment that the Civil Rights Act was designed to curtail, which is why equality 
principles should play a role in preventing harassment through application in preemption 
analyses. A law could be deemed “inconsistent with federal purposes” if it threatens the 
risk of harassment or abuse. Guttentag, supra note 124, at 49–50. Thus, correspondingly, 
where a state law decreases or counteracts the possibility of such a threat or risk of harm, 
equality principles founded in federal civil rights law may result in finding the sub-federal 
measure not preempted.  
 233 See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
 234 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 137 (“[O]ne of the most essential functions of the 
federal government has been to make sure that regions, states, or localities are not 
allowed to decide who is an American in ways that rely improperly on race or ethnicity.”) 
(suggesting that this federal role trumps the federal government ’s role in conducting 
foreign affairs in supporting immigration federal exclusivity or exceptionalism).  
 235 Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
 236 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 115. There may be a higher likelihood of racial and 
ethnic discrimination by sub-federal law enforcement officers on the street exercising 
micro level discretion, resulting indirectly in inappropriately biased decisions about 
immigration enforcement, and that bias escapes remedy. Thus, “limiting the state and 
local role in immigration law is a way of preventing discrimination in state and local 
enforcement before it might happen.” Id.  
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preempted by federal immigration law precisely because 
immigration law includes the discretion not to arrest, and not to 
deport individuals who may in fact be deportable.237 In addition 
to being able to exercise discretion not to arrest a suspected 
unauthorized migrant, or not to pursue removal proceedings, 
immigration law creates discretionary forms of relief from 
removal. Where sub-federal laws interfere with the federal 
government’s intended broad exercises of authority in 
immigration enforcement, some state immigration laws may 
properly be found preempted. In part because of federal 
exclusivity principles, and because the TRUST Act does not 
constrict the federal government’s ability to exercise discretion in 
the enforcement of immigration law, it should not be found 
preempted. 
Preemption analysis should take into consideration not only 
the source of the law, but also the substance,238 and whether the 
execution of the law will have discriminatory effects.239 Similarly, 
courts should heed inherent equality concerns in federal 
immigration law when considering whether federal immigration 
law preempts state integrative measures. 
CONCLUSION  
Millions of non-citizens in the United States either live with 
the threat of racial profiling by law enforcement agents or have 
experienced it. They know that such profiling can impact their 
life’s trajectory and that of their families. Sub-federal 
involvement in immigration enforcement resulting from Secure 
Communities—and now PEP—and immigration detainer 
practices have played a direct role in creating both this perceived 
and actual threat. There is substantive support for allegations of 
ethnic or racial bias in immigration policing, particularly in 
conjunction with Secure Communities.  
Legal avenues to prevent such profiling, or reverse the 
harms stemming from it, are insufficient. In the continued 
absence of immigration reform permitting millions to go to work, 
attend school, and care for their families without the fear of 
detection and deportation, TRUST Acts and similar measures 
have arisen. 
 
 237 Id. at 121.  
 238 MOTOMURA, supra note 52, at 136–37 (“In defining the constitutional division of 
power between the federal government and states and localities, the content of state and 
local decisions also matters.”). 
 239 Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 102, at 2131 (“[T]o the extent federal 
courts insist on treating laws like S.B. 1070 as alienage laws, they must pay heed to the 
equality concerns inherent in the creation—and not just the execution—of such laws.”). 
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If state laws that support immigrant equality or integration 
are considered in the context of the anti-discrimination aspects of 
federal immigration law and the Civil Rights Act, they may be 
understood as consistent with federal law and not preempted. By 
incorporating equality principles and employing civil rights 
preemption, a court could find a discriminatory state law 
preempted under either a federal exclusivity or statutory 
preemption model. Similarly, a state law that prevents 
discrimination or furthers inclusiveness should be viewed as in 
line with federal law and not preempted. 
This Article has examined why immigrant integrative 
measures like the TRUST Act should be able to survive a 
preemption challenge. Eventually, federal immigration reform 
may decrease sub-federal legislating relating to immigration law. 
However, the essential equality principles derived from the Civil 
Rights Act and incorporated into immigration law may 
eventually return to the forefront in preemption litigation. 
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